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Abstract
This paper quantitatively investigates the scope for improving welfare by making
aspects of the unemployment insurance (UI) system depend on the state of the business
cycle. A particular focus is the Canadian system of “Employment Insurance” (EI),
which is designed in such a way that the generosity of benefits depends on the state of
the macroeconomy.
Simulations of a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents and search frictions
confirm the expectation that optimal UI systems may be characterized by a substantial
increase in generosity during recessions, when adverse labour market conditions reduce
the importance of moral hazard while increasing the need for consumption insurance.
It turns out, however, that the welfare improvements resulting from this sort of
temporal differentiation of benefits are extremely small. Quantitatively, the effects
of insurance against business cycle effects provided by the Canadian EI system is
dominated by the welfare implications of the inter-regional redistribution inherent in
the system.
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1 Introduction
There has been increasing interest recently in the benefits of making the generosity of
the unemployment insurance (UI) system depend on the current state of the business cycle
and current labour market conditions. The key to designing an efficient UI system is to find
the right trade-off between the consumption insurance that a generous system provides and
the moral hazard it induces. A wide range of policies that let benefits follow time-dependent
profiles have been studied.1 Tatsiramos and van Ours (2012) provide an up-to-date survey.
The basic idea underlying the time-varying benefits that are the focus of this paper is that
during recessions, unemployment is high but the labour market is slow. This means that on
the one hand, making benefits more easily available can substantially improve consumption
insurance, while at the same time the effect of such a measure on overall unemployment is
likely to be lower than during a boom, as the chances of re-employment are low anyway,
leaving less scope for moral hazard.
This type of time-varying UI scheme has been proposed by Kiley (2003) and Sa´nchez
(2008) in a repeated moral hazard framework similar to Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
Andersen and Svarer (2010) use a Mortensen-Pissarides search model to show that an optimal
system would be substantially more generous than the US system during recessions. Kroft
and Notowidigdo (2010) find similar results in a model with stochastic wage offers similar
to Shimer and Werning (2007). Mitman and Rabinowich (2011) emphasize that optimal
benefits may follow more complex paths over the business cycle. They argue that UI systems
should become less generous over the course of a recession to speed up recovery and be pro-
cyclical overall. Another possible reason for procyclical benefits may be the requirement to
balance the government budget every period as discussed in Andersen and Svarer (2011).
Determining whether optimal benefits generosity is procyclical or countercyclical has been
one focus of this literature. The key contribution of Landais et al. (2010) is to show how the
1The aspect that has received the most attentions is how benefits should depend on the duration of the
unemployment spell. See Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and the literature that followed.
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optimality of benefits can be assessed in any state using an extended Baily-Chetty criterion
that accounts for general-equilibrium search externality present in two-sided search models.2
Due to the complexity of the policy problem at hand, theoretical models of time-varying
unemployment insurance regularly incorporate strong assumptions that may limit applica-
bility of the results in a real-world context. In particular, all the papers mentioned above
assume hand-to-mouth consumption and therefore rule out the possibility that households
self-insure through saving.3 It is one of the main contributions of this paper to examine
business-cycle dependent UI in a more realistic general-equilibrium setting with fully opti-
mizing agents. Another paper that does this is Kristoffersen (2012), who investigates optimal
UI systems in a general equilibrium model similar to Krusell et al. (2010) with fully opti-
mizing, infinitely lived households. The author finds that, in line with the arguments of
Landais et al. (2010), either procyclical or countercyclical benefits can be optimal, but that
the welfare consequences of allowing for differentiated UI generosity over the business cycle
are extremely small.4
The Canadian Employment Insurance (EI) program is an interesting example of a system
that does implement counter-cyclical generosity, as it includes mechanisms to make benefits
more easily available when the unemployment rate is high. Specifically, benefit durations
depend on the number of hours worked during a qualifying period. In regions with high
unemployment, fewer hours are required to qualify for a given benefit duration and the
maximum durations are longer. The replacement ratio does not depend on labour market
conditions, though.5 While these features of the system are often interpreted as a means of
2Other contributions to this literature include Ek (2012), Jung and Kuester (2011), Moyen and Sta¨hler
(2009) and Schuster (2012).
3It should be noted, however, that the criterion developed in Landais et al. likely generalizes to the case
of endogenous savings, just as Baily’s criterion does.
4In contrast to our model, Kristoffersen (2012) employs an infinite horizon setting rather than a life-cycle
model. Moreover, he does not allow for moral hazard of any kind.
5The UI system in the US also employs a mechanism that can lead to automatic increases in benefit
durations during recessions. “Extended Benefits,” which increase the benefit duration by 13 or 20 weeks
beyond the usual 26 weeks, are triggered by a combination of high unemployment rates and strong increases
in unemployment in a state.
Another country where benefit durations depend on the regional unemployment rate is Poland. However,
because extended durations are triggered by high unemployment relative to the national average and only
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interprovincial redistribution, they do have business-cycle implications if the unemployment
rate varies enough over time.
There is a growing literature that investigates the effects of extensions to benefit durations
during recessions empirically. Farber and Valetta (2013) and Rothstein (2011) use data from
the American Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that extended benefit durations lead
to small but significant extensions in unemployment durations. Schmieder et al. (2012) find
similar results in German data.6 Using a different approach based on a simulated structural
model with fully optimizing households whose productivity depends on their employment
history, Nakajima (2012) attributes almost a third of the rise in US unemployment during
the 2009-2011 period to extended benefit durations.
This paper investigates the scope for improving welfare by adjusting UI generosity over
the business cycle. This is done quantitatively using a general equilibrium model with
overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents that is calibrated to resemble the Canadian
economy. I consider the efficiency effects of changing replacement ratios and benefit durations
over the business cycle. Moreover, I investigate the welfare and distributional implications
of the fact that by design, the Canadian EI system varies benefits not only over time, but
also across regions.
The plan for this paper is as follows. The following section makes a simple quantitative
argument that expected welfare effects of UI differentiation are small. Then I briefly intro-
duce relevant aspects of the Canadian EI system. Sections 4 and 5 describe the model and
discuss its calibration and simulation. The main results are presented in section 6. First,
the welfare implications of a range of possible UI policies are discussed in the context of the
aggregate Canadian economy. Optimal UI policies with and without time-varying benefit
schedules are derived for several classes of systems. Then the model is calibrated to match
the characteristics of groups of regions that are treated differently under the current EI
with long lags, the Polish system is unlikely to provide particularly effective insurance against business cycle
effects. See Sienkiewicz (2011).
6Even though benefit durations do not vary with labour market conditions in Germany, the authors are
able to exploit the fact that older individuals are entitled to extended benefits.
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system to investigate the insurance and distributional properties of the program. Section
7 presents alternative specifications and robustness checks. After a brief discussion of the
main findings in part 8, the final section of the paper concludes.
2 Business Cycle Dependent UI and Welfare
Most of the simulation exercises presented in this paper address the question of how UI
benefit differentiation over the business cycle affects welfare. To get an idea of the magnitude
of the welfare effects to expect, this section presents a simple numerical example that suggests
that – as long as the undifferentiated UI system is chosen optimally – switching to the optimal
differentiated system is likely to have a very small impact on utilitarian welfare.
Consider an economy that can be in two states, i = `, h, which occur with probabilities
pii. When in state `, the economy is in a recession. Individuals can be either employed or
unemployed. While employed, they enjoy a consumption level of ce and when unemployed,
their consumption level is ciu, which may depend on the state i if the UI system is differen-
tiated. Let U i be the unemployment rate in each state and U¯ the average unemployment
rate. u(c) is the individuals’ utility as a function of consumption.
Assume that the UI system influences households’ consumption. It is easy to derive an
optimality criteria in the spirit of Baily (1978) for the consumption level of unemployed
households under utilitarian welfare. For a differentiated system that controls c`u and c
h
u
separately, the criteria are
u′(ciu)
u′(ce)
= 1 + i, (1)
where i is the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to ciu in each of the state.
For an undifferentiated system that results in cu = c
`
u = c
h
u, the criterion becomes
u′(cu)
u′(ce)
= 1 + ¯. (2)
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¯ =
(
pi`U `` + pihUhlh
)
/U¯ is the weighted average of the elasticities in the two macro states.
Calibrate the probabilities of the states as U ` = 9%, Uh = 7% and pi` = 10% and assume a
constant relative risk aversion of 3. Under an undifferentiated system, let ch = 1 and c` = 0.9.
This is in line with the findings of Gruber (1997), who reports that individuals losing their
job experience an initial consumption drop of 6.8%. Now suppose that the underlying UI
system is optimal, so that condition (1) is satisfied. This implies that ¯ = 37.2%. Suppose
further that in the bad state, there is no moral hazard problem, i.e. ` = 0. Then, h must
be 42.5%.
What is the effect of switching to the optimal differentiated system? Under this system,
individuals must be fully insured in the bad state. It turns out that ce = c
`
u = 0.9998, c
h
u
slightly drops to 0.8884, and Uh falls to 6.962%. While there is a noticeable differentiation of
the consumption levels of unemployed individuals over the business cycle under the optimal
policy7, the resulting welfare improvement of 0.025% is extremely small.
There are two main reasons for this result. Firstly, we implicitly allowed households to
self-insure, which led to a moderate consumption drop during unemployment. If one insists
that a replacement ratio of 50% is associated with a 50% consumption reduction after job loss,
it is possible to find much larger welfare effects. Secondly, we assumed that the generosity
of the undifferentiated system was chosen optimally. If this assumption is dropped, it is
possible to obtain almost arbitrarily large welfare effects by switching from a very inefficient
system to one which at least determines the benefit level in recessions efficiently.
Starting in section 4 below, we will introduce a model in which households’ ability to
self-insure is determined endogenously in a life-cycle setting. Simulations will show to what
extent it is possible to improve welfare by differentiating UI generosity in different settings.
7The 11% differentiation of consumption levels would likely be associated with a much larger differenti-
ation of actual UI benefits if households self-insure.
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3 The Canadian EI System
For the purpose of administering EI, Canada is divided into 58 “EI Economic Regions,”
which are chosen to cover individual labour markets or areas with homogenous labour market
conditions. The geographical definition of these regions has been changed in the past. Figure
1 shows their current configuration, which has been in place since July 2000.
Figure 1: Employment Insurance Economic Regions
Source: “EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2011,” Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,
Annex 7.
For each of these regions, the 3-months moving average of the seasonally adjusted unem-
ployment rate is used to determine the conditions for the receipt of EI benefits. EI economic
regions are clustered into one of 12 groups based on this unemployment figure (no more than
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Table 1: Regional Unemployment and Maximum Benefit Duration
hoursa
unemployment rate less or equal
6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% –
420-454 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 28 30 32
455-489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 26 28 30 32
490-524 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 25 27 29 31 33
525-559 0 0 0 0 0 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
560-594 0 0 0 0 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
595-629 0 0 0 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
630-664 0 0 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
665-699 0 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
700-734 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
735-769 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
...
1715-1749 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 45 45 45 45 45
1750-1784 34 36 38 40 42 44 45 45 45 45 45 45
1785-1819 35 37 39 41 43 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
1820- 36 38 40 42 44 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
a number of insurable hours of work during the qualifying period, which is typically
the 52 weeks before job loss
6%, 6% to 7%, 7% to 8%, etc. up to 16% and more).8 The conditions for the receipt of
benefit depends on the unemployment rate in a person’s region of residence. The higher
this rate, the easier it is to qualify for benefits and the longer is the benefit duration. The
required number of hours of work to qualify for benefits ranges from 420 in the 12 months
prior to job loss (in regions with an unemployment rate above 13%) to 700 hours (if the
unemployment rate is 6% or less). The benefit duration increases with the number of hours
8 The official unemployment rates reported and used for this purpose by Human Resources and Skill
Development Canada (HRSDC), the federal agency administering the unemployment insurance program,
differ somewhat from those published by Statistics Canada, even though they are derived from the same
survey. The most important difference is that in contrast to Statistics Canada, HRSDC includes aboriginal
people living on reserves in their calculations. This leads to higher unemployment measures mostly in the
relatively sparsely populated northern parts of the provinces.
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worked up to a maximum between 36 weeks in low-unemployment regions and 45 weeks in
high-unemployment regions. Table 1 shows the relationship between the regional unemploy-
ment rate and maximum benefit duration for a subset of the relevant qualification period
brackets.9
The aspect of the EI system that is most interesting for our purpose is how maximum
benefit durations depend on regional unemployment rates. As can be seen in the last row of
table 1, according to this criterion the EI economic regions can be classified into six groups.
Figure 2: Unemployment Rates across Economic Regions
Source: “EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2012,” Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,
Annex 1.
9Even though the requirements are stated in terms of insurable hours, the underlying idea is to model
the system around a 35-hour workweek. The somewhat complicated pattern is as follows: For the same
number of qualifying hours, the maximum benefit duration increases by 2 weeks per extra percentage point
of regional unemployment. For every additional 70 hours (35 hours) of insurable work, the benefit duration
increases by one week if the total number of hours is between 420 and 1,399 (between 1,400 and 1,820). The
minimum number of hours required is 420 in regions with more than 13% unemployment. This minimum
requirement increases by 35 hours for each one-percentage-point drop of local unemployment. No benefit
durations of more than 45 weeks are possible.
9
Figure 2 reports the official unemployment rates in these regions for 2011-12.10 Clearly,
the wide range of regional unemployment rates over which the generosity of the system
varies has been chosen for a reason. Generally, unemployment rates tend to be higher in the
four Atlantic Provinces Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick and relatively low in the Prairie Provinces Alberta, Saskatchewan and
Manitoba. Within provinces, unemployment rates are typically higher in the northern EI
regions.
EI is financed through contributions, which are adjusted annually. In 2013, the total
contribution rate was 4.51% on earnings up to the maximum insurable amount of $47,400,
which is also adjusted every year.11 This contribution rate is not an ideal indicator of the cost
of UI in Canada, as the EI program does not only provide UI benefits, called regular benefits,
but also parental benefits, sickness benefits and benefits to self-employed fishermen, among
others. The ratios of regular benefits to insurable earnings and total employment income
were 2.70% and 1.71%, respectively, in 2010.12
4 The Model
In any given period t, the economy is in one of two possible macro states st ∈ {0, 1}. In the
bad state s = 0, which will be identified with periods of recession, total factor productivity
(TFP) p(st) is lower and the risk of job loss is higher. The sequence of macro states follows
a Markov process.
10The official unemployment rate in regions 56 to 58, Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, is
25%. Even though Statistics Canada measures the unemployment rates in these territories, the corresponding
component of the Labour Force Survey is deemed experimental.
11The contributions are split between employers and employees. Employers always pay 1.4 times the
employees’ contributions. Since 2006, Quebec has had a different contribution rate, which is somewhat lower
than the federal rate.
12See EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2012, Annexes 2.18 and 2.19.
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4.1 Households
The economy is populated by equally large overlapping generations of heterogeneous
agents. Each individual has a life span of 60 years, corresponding to ages 20 to 79. Important
events include entry into the economy and the labour market at age 20, retirement at age 65
and death at 80 years of age. All agents are identical initially; however, their actual income
profiles over their lives differ due to the idiosyncratic nature of labour market opportunities,
resulting in different asset levels and consumption possibilities among individuals of the same
cohort.
When they first enter the economy, agents are endowed with assets corresponding to three
months of labour income13, but they do not have a job. If an individual is unemployed in
period t, she receives job offers at the rate ω(st). These employment opportunities differ in
productivity and are therefore characterized by different wages.14 Once an agent receives an
acceptable offer, a job is created and production begins in the following period. Moral hazard
arises in the form of individual reservation wages (or equivalently reservation match qualities)
that deviate from the social optimum.15 Jobs last until they are destroyed, which happens
at the exogenous state-dependent rate λ(st), or when the agent reaches her retirement age.
After retirement, all agents must rely on assets and interest income for consumption.
Agents maximize the expected utility derived from consumption during the rest of their
deterministic lifetime, which is assumed to be time separable.
maxEt
[
Ti∑
s=t
βs−tu(cit)
]
(3)
Here, the index i refers to the individual, Ti is the last period of agent i’s life, β > 0 is a
discount factor and u(cit) is the agent’s instantaneous utility as function of consumption cit.
13Three months of the income earned by a 20-year-old agent in a job with match quality one and a
reservation wage of zero.
14This mechanism is similar to the one used by Shimer and Werning (2007) and Kroft and Notowidigdo
(2010.)
15Agents who decline jobs are not sanctioned by the government. Pallage and Zimmermann (2005) argue
that such sanctions are an important mechanism to control moral hazard in reality.
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Agents can save at the prevailing interest rate r, but they are unable to borrow.16 For
every period t of an agent’s life, her financial wealth ait therefore evolves according to the
budget and borrowing constraint
ait+1 = (1 + r)(ait + yit − cit) ≥ 0, (BC)
where yit is any income received during this period, which could be wages or UI benefits.
17
4.2 Firms and the Labour Market
The labour market is characterized by a Mortensen-Pissarides setting with two-sided
search.18 In order to produce output, firms must first post a vacancy, then wait for a worker
to be matched and negotiate a contract. Unfilled vacancies are associated with a flow cost
of kp(st) that is proportional to TFP. The frequency of matches between workers and firms
is determined by an aggregate matching function. Following the literature on job search, I
assume that this function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, so that the rate
of job offers unemployed workers receive can be written as ω(st) = ω¯ (θ(st))
η, where θ(st) is
the market tightness as a function of the macro state.
Each firm (or job) produces output for a competitive goods market using capital and
labour as inputs. The production technology is Cobb-Douglas with a capital share of α.
Capital depreciates at the rate δ. The productivity of a worker i on a job j depends on
two factors, the worker’s inherent productivity qit and the quality of the match mij. qit
increases deterministically over an agent’s working life, whereas mij is a measure of how
good the applicant fits the job description. For each match, this match quality mij is drawn
from a lognormal distribution, lnmij ∼ N(−12σ2m, σ2m). mij and qit together determine
16I assume that the interest rate is exogenous, which is probably reasonable approximation for a small
open economy such as Canada. This assumption also simplifies the model considerably compared to a
closed-economy model with time-varying interest rates as in Krusell and Smith (1998).
17See appendix A for further details and a formal description of the household’s problem.
18See Pissarides (2000).
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the effective labour supplied by worker i on job j, so that the output produced is given
by Yijt = p(st) (mijqit)
1−αKαjt. The capital input Kjt is adjusted optimally every period,
implying Yijt =
(
α
r+δ
) α
1−α p(st)
1
1−αmijqit.
When a firm and a worker meet, Nash bargaining over the part of the labour share
(1− α)Yijt that is paid to the worker as a wage wijt takes place. Once a job is created, the
ratio
wijt
Yijt
stays constant as wages are adjusted to reflect changes in aggregate and individual
productivities.19
The market tightness in each state is determined by the condition that the expected value
of a vacancy be zero. In other words, the aggregate vacancy costs in each state are equal to
the rents earned by firms on jobs created in the same state.20
4.3 The Capital Market and the Government
Capital is supplied elastically by the world capital market at the interest rate r.
The government runs a UI system. It makes payments to eligible working-age individuals.
Moreover, the government provides new agents with their initial asset allocation.21 To pay
for these expenditures, the government levies a proportional tax at a constant rate on all
labour income and transfers, i.e. on wages, UI benefits and the agents’ initial endowment.22
4.4 Long-run Equilibrium
The economy just described is defined to be in a stationary equilibrium if
1. households maximize their utility,
19The bargaining is over the present value of income streams rather than utility. The output from the job
above the household’s reservation wage is split according to the relative bargaining strengths of the two sides.
This means that given this reservation wage, in negotiations households act as if they were risk neutral.
20I make the simplifying assumption that the market tightness depends on the current state only. This
neglects the possibility of using the current distribution of household characteristics to predict time-varying
reservation wages more accurately. This simplification is necessary for computational reasons, and is unlikely
to be quantitatively important.
21Note that this means that the tax rate will be positive even if no UI benefits are paid.
22The assumption that all wages and transfers are taxed at the same rate makes it possible to solve the
model independent of tax policy in the case of CRRA preferences.
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2. firms maximize their profits,
3. given the tightness θt ∈ {θ(0), θ(1)} in each macro state s ∈ {0, 1}, the total expendi-
ture on vacancies equals the expected rents earned on jobs created in this state,
4. the government budget is balanced on average over the business cycle, and
5. the cross-sectional distribution of the population with respect to individual character-
istics is stationary.
5 Calibration and Computation
The model is calibrated to match the aggregate Canadian economy or groups of EI
economic regions as discussed below. Whenever possible, the model economy replicates
features of the Canadian economy between July 2000 and December 2012. This time frame
is chosen to make use of all available microdata on EI economic regions in their current
configuration, which has been in place since July 2000. These 121
2
years are a short time
for measuring business cycle effects, however. This period only includes one relatively short
recession. For this reason, some parameters are calibrated using a longer data period from
January 1976 to June 2013.23 The starting point of this extended period was chosen to
match the introduction of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the main source of labour market
statistics in Canada, in its present form.
For the calibration exercise, I use a specification of the unemployment insurance system
that resembles the Canadian Employment Insurance. Specifically, benefits are paid after a
waiting period of two weeks at a replacement ratio of 55%. In practice, the duration of the
benefits depends on the prevailing unemployment rate as well as an individual’s number of
hours of insurable work during a qualifying period. Since the work requirement is relatively
23Note that the this extended period is exactly three times as long as the shorter period – 37 12 years or
450 months vs. 12 12 years or 150 months. Recessions are occurring more frequently in the extended period,
accounting for 10% of all quarters compared to 6% in the shorter period.
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low compared to the typical time between two unemployment spells, I assume that everyone
is entitled to receive benefits for the maximum duration available to those with about one
year of full-time employment. Benefit durations depend on whether the unemployment spell
begins during a boom or a recession. For the aggregate economy, average unemployment
rates of 7% to 8% in the good state and 9% to 10% during recessions imply benefit durations
of 40 and 44 weeks, respectively.
The households’ instantaneous utility function u is assumed to exhibit a constant relative
risk aversion of γ = 3. The annual discount rate is 4%. These values are standard in the
macroeconomic literature.
The interest rate is set to the average long-term interest rate of 2.4% for the 2000:7 to
2012:12 period.
Individual productivity qit increases deterministically in a piecewise linear fashion with
age to generate lifetime income profiles that resemble those found in household panel data.24
It rises by 60% between ages 20 and 35, and then by another 20 percentage points until
retirement.
The transition probabilities between the macro states are chosen to match the average
frequency and duration of recessions in Canada between 1976:Q1 and 2013:Q2. The average
duration of recessions during this time was 33
4
quarters, with recessions accounting for exactly
10% of the periods.
Productivity is set to be 5.1% lower during recessions, which is the average multifactor
productivity (MFP) differential for the business sector between 1976 and 2009 as reported
by Statistics Canada.25 Production is characterized by a capital share of α = 1
3
and a
depreciation rate of δ = 8% per year.
The matching parameter η is set to 1
2
, in line with the empirical literature. The variance
of match qualities of σ2m = 1% is consistent with the estimates reported in Pollak (2013).
The remaining parameters are calibrated such that the simulated model matches certain
24See e.g. Rupert and Zanella (2010).
25Multifactor productivity is reported at annual frequency, with 2009 being the most recent year available.
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aspects of the data. Specifically, for the calibration of the aggregate economy, the matching
rate ω(1) = 0.323 per period is chosen to generate an unemployment rate of 7.13% in the good
state, equal to the 2000:7-2012:12 average. Market tightness in the high state is normalized
to θ(1) = 1. The matching rate in the low state is then implied to be ω(0) = 0.306, given the
lower market tightness θ(0) = 0.898 resulting from lower profits during recessions. The job
destruction rate during recessions of λ(0) = 1.43% per period implies an average monthly
increase of the unemployment rate of 0.25 percentage points, matching the respective value
for the Canadian economy between 1976:1 and 2013:6. Finally, setting λ(1) = 0.90% gives
an average unemployment duration of 13.8 weeks, equal to the average found in the LFS for
the 2000:7 to 2012:12 period.
The household’s relative bargaining strength is set to 95%. This relatively high value
implies a vacancy cost of k = 0.58 in the model calibrated to the aggregate economy. In
the simulations reported below, market tightness in the good state is normalized to one. In
this case, the vacancy cost is about 5.8% of the average wage. Statistics Canada reports an
actual market tightness of only about 1
6
, however.26 Under this low market tightness, the
corresponding vacancy-cost-to-wage ratio of about one third is consistent with the values
reported in the empirical literature.27
The calibrated parameters for the aggregate scenario are summarized in table 2.28
The model is simulated at a period length of 1
2
month, i.e. at 24 periods per year or
1440 periods in a lifetime. To solve the model for a particular UI system and parameter
constellation, it is necessary to determine the market tightness parameters. This is done as
follows. First, the household’s problem is solved for a given set of tightness parameters. Then
the economy is simulated for a large number of periods. The market tightness parameters
26See series v65958686 and v65958994 for the number of vacancies and unemployed at monthly frequency.
Reliable vacancy data for Canada has only been available since 2011. Please note that the job vacancy rates
reported by Statistics Canada are based on a narrow definition of unemployment and thus differ from the
market tightness concept used in the theoretical literature.
27This is essentially the same vacancy cost that has been used by Landais et al. (2010). Empirical studies
tend to find values between about 10% and 60%, see Barron et al. (1997), Silva and Toledo (2005) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
28Further details regarding the data used in the calibration can be found in appendix B.
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Table 2: Calibration: Aggregate Canadian Economy
parameter value
γ relative risk aversion 3.0
β discount rate 0.96a
α capital share 13
δ depreciation rate 8%a
 household’s bargaining power 0.95
η matching parameter 12
σ2m variance of match quality 0.01
matching parameter to data
r interest rate 2.41%a 10-year avg. yield of government bonds
p(0)/q(1) relative productivity in bad state 0.949 drop in MFP during recessions
s = 0→ s = 0 probability of remaining in s = 0 0.956b avg. duration of recessions
s = 1→ s = 1 probability of remaining in s = 1 0.995b avg. time between recessions
matching equilibrium outcome
ω(1) rate of job offers (st = 1) 0.323
b unemployment rate in good state
λ(0) job destruction rate (st = 0) 1.43%
b rise in unemployment during recessions
λ(1) job destruction rate (st = 1) 0.90%
b unemployment duration
k vacancy cost 0.581b zero profit for θ(1) = 1
a per year
b per period ( 124 year)
are adjusted based on the simulation results, with the objective to make expected profits in
the firm sector zero. This process is repeated until convergence.29
The household’s problem is solved by recursively finding the value function for each of the
1,440 periods of an agent’s lifetime, starting with the last one. The functions are calculated
on a multidimensional grid, using linear interpolation between grid points.30 The periods
prior to retirement are much more complex to solve because of the larger number of state
29 A total of 1,440,000 periods (60,000 years) is simulated with a cohort size of one person and 1,440
overlapping cohorts at any point in time. The convergence criterion used is a deviation of the market
tightness from its predicted value by less than 0.1%.
30Further details on the numerical solution strategy are provided in appendix C.
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variables (assets, employment status, current match quality or benefit level, UI entitlement,
aggregate state of the economy).31
The finite size of the simulated sample as well the deviation permitted by the convergence
criterion lead to noise in the variables obtained in the simulation runs.32 Table 3 summarizes
the implications for some variables of interest.
Table 3: Accuracy of selected equilibrium measurements
variable coefficient of variation max. rel. deviation
welfarea,b 1.02 · 10−5 2.78 · 10−5
expected lifetime utilityb 5.59 · 10−5 4.13 · 10−4
θ(0) 3.39 · 10−4 1.16 · 10−3
θ(1) 9.32 · 10−5 2.86 · 10−4
unemployment rate (s = 0) 1.85 · 10−4 4.46 · 10−4
unemployment rate (s = 1) 5.56 · 10−5 1.55 · 10−4
consumption 6.60 · 10−6 2.39 · 10−5
tax rate 5.65 · 10−5 2.01 · 10−4
a utilitarian welfare excluding individuals who have never worked
b measured in consumption units
Note: Coefficient of variation and maximum relative deviation from the
mean found in 200 simulation runs using different starting values.
6 Results
6.1 Efficient Provision of UI over the Business Cycle
Our first objective is to characterize properties of an efficient UI system quantitatively.
This is done by using the calibrated model of the aggregate Canadian economy to perform
a number of simulations under different UI systems and comparing characteristics of the
31The most complex value functions just prior to retirement have far over 100,000 nodes (497 asset states,
18 job match levels, 19 benefit levels, 7 UI entitlement levels, 2 employment states and 2 macro states).
32To further improve the accuracy of the simulation, all results are averaged over ten simulation runs
with different simulated samples.
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resulting equilibria.33 The UI systems considered in this exercise have the following prop-
erties: Agents who lose their job are entitled to receive benefits. The benefit duration is
determined at the time of job loss, like in the Canadian system. This duration may be
different depending on whether the spell begins during a good or bad state. There is no
waiting period. The replacement ratio may also depend on the state of the economy. At
any point in time, however, all unemployed individuals receive the same benefit, i.e. the
replacement ratio for an individual may change if the state of the economy changes. The UI
system is therefore characterized by four parameters, two replacement ratios ρ(s) and two
benefit durations d(s).
The welfare criterion used throughout this paper is utilitarian. I exclude agents from the
welfare measure who have never had a job and are therefore ineligible to receive benefits.34
All welfare changes are reported in consumption-equivalent units.35
Appendix D gives an overview of the effects of UI by reporting and summarizing the
results of simulating a large number of UI policies with replacement ratios ranging from
0% to 100% and benefit durations of up to 18 months. In what follows, we will focus on
the implications of implementing benefits that are differentiated based on the state of the
business cycle.36
The solid line in the top left panel of Figure 3 shows the optimal choice of replacement
33As the focus of this paper is not UI reform, we will be considering steady states only. For the importance
of transition paths for the welfare implications of UI policy changes, see Mukoyama (2012).
34Agents who have not yet successfully entered the labour market are excluded for simple practical reasons.
As these individuals are all unemployed but not eligible to receive UI benefits, their welfare tends to depend
strongly on the prevailing market tightness. Generally, these agents favour less generous systems as they
imply a higher matching rate and lower taxes on initial wealth. Depending on the assumptions regarding
young agents’ initial endowment with assets, the impact of the welfare of this group on overall utilitarian
welfare may be anywhere from negligible to dominating. In the absence of a serious calibration of the
average level and cross-sectional variation of initial financial wealth or access to other means of support -
such as social assistance or support from relatives - I decided to remove this group entirely from the welfare
calculation. This allows us to focus on the business-cycle properties of UI rather than distributional effects
regarding young unemployed.
Note that this issue does not arise in an infinite-horizon setting where everybody has an employment history
and is thus potentially eligible to receive UI benefits.
35A reported 1% welfare improvement is equivalent to the welfare change that would have resulted from
a general 1% increase in consumption.
36Given our calibration, particularly with regards to risk aversion, optimal benefit generosity tends to be
lower than the existing policy. Experiments in section 7 consider alternative levels of risk aversion.
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Figure 3: Optimal differentiation of benefits over the business cycle
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Note: Upper panels: Optimal policy parameter in recessions as a function of policy parameter during
non-recessions (solid line) compared to no differentiation over the business cycle (dashed line). The shaded
area shows the range of policy parameters that yield welfare within 1100% of the optimal choice.
Lower panels: Relative welfare improvement from choosing optimal differentiation over no differentiation as
a function of the policy parameter during non-recessions.
Left: Varying replacement ratio for a fixed benefit duration of 3 months.
Right: Varying benefit duration for a fixed replacement ratio of 30%.
Values obtained for a 4th-order polynomial approximation of simulated welfare function.
ratios during recessions, ρ(0), as a function of replacement ratios in normal times, ρ(1)
for a constant benefit duration d(s) = 3. The dashed line corresponds to undifferentiated
replacement ratios, ρ(0) = ρ(1). The optimal level of ρ(0) rises monotonically with ρ(1) and
is above ρ(1) for replacement ratios below 40%. In this range, countercyclical UI generosity
is desirable. For ρ(1) > 40% generosity should be procyclical. As pointed out by Landais
et al. (2010), the two factors determining the optimal benefit generosity at the margin are
its effect on the insurance-cost trade-off as summarized by the Baily-Chetty condition37 and
its general-equilibrium effect on the search externality. Given our calibration, the second
effect always works towards countercyclical generosity. The optimal undifferentiated policy
is ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 24% while the optimal differentiated policy is ρ(0) = 34% and ρ(1) = 23%.38
37Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006)
38These results coincide with the optimal policies reported in the ρ(s) ≥ 20% and d(s) ≥ 3 scenario in
table 4 below.
20
Clearly, there is a benefit to a differentiated policy that outweighs its costs well beyond the
optimal level of generosity. For ρ(1) > 40%, however, the high moral-hazard costs of of
procyclical replacement ratios make them unattractive from a welfare perspective.
Even though the optimal level of ρ(0) may differ substantially from ρ(1), the welfare cost
of choosing an undifferentiated system over the policy involving the optimal replacement
ratio during recessions is very low. The gray area in the figure shows the range of ρ(0) that
involves a welfare reduction of less than 1
100
% compared to the optimal choice of ρ(0). Note
that the dashed line representing ρ(0) = ρ(1) lies within this range for ρ(1) < 90%, which
means that the cost of the undifferentiated system compared to the optimally differentiated
system is small. The lower left panel of figure 3 explicitly shows this welfare cost.
The two panels on the right of figure 3 show the corresponding effects of varying benefit
durations instead of replacement ratios. For a fixed replacement ratio of ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 30%
the optimal benefit duration d(0) is shown as a function of d(1) in the upper panel. In this
scenario, countercyclical generosity is desirable for benefit durations of up 21
2
months. An
interesting feature of the optimal benefit duration is that it is not a continuous function
of d(1). The discontinuity results from the fact that the welfare function is generally non-
concave in d(0).39 Again, the welfare costs of choosing an undifferentiated policy d(0) = d(1)
over the optimal differentiated one for any level of d(1) is very small.40
In both of the above scenarios that vary either replacement ratios or benefit durations
taking the other policy variable as given, it may be optimal to implement a considerable
differentiation of UI over the business cycle. Under our parametrization, benefit generosity
should be procyclical in the vicinity of the optimal non-recession parameter value.
39Note that the discontinuity occurs for a rather high value of d(1), more than five times the optimum.
40In this scenario, the optimal undifferentiated policy is d(0) = d(1) = 2.0 months and the optimal
differentiated policy is d(0) = 2.4 months and d(1) = 1.9 months.
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Table 4: Optimal UI
Canadian EI d(s) =∞ d(s)→ 0 ρ(s) ≥ 20% and d(s) ≥ 3
optimal constr. optimal optimal constr. optimal optimal constr. optimal
ρ(0) 55% 5.1% 4.7% 255% 162% 34% 24%
ρ(1) 55% 4.6% 4.7% 148% 162% 23% 24%
d(0) (months) 10.1 ∞ ∞ 12 12 3 3
d(1) (months) 9.2 ∞ ∞ 12 12 3 3
welfare change (total) – 0.785% 0.784% 0.687% 0.684% 0.643% 0.642%
welfare change (s = 0) – 0.536% 0.501% 0.968% 0.474% 0.581% 0.349%
unemploymenta 9.87%/7.13% 7.22%/5.17% 7.20%/5.18% 7.35%/5.14% 7.19%/5.16% 7.48%/5.24% 7.32%/5.25%
market tightnessa 0.90/1.00 1.36/1.43 1.36/1.43 1.32/1.46 1.38/1.45 1.29/1.42 1.34/1.41
consumption 7.68 7.84 7.84 7.94 7.94 7.90 7.90
tax rate 4.05% 0.59% 0.59% 1.84% 1.84% 1.25% 1.24%
match quality 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07
Note: Optimal policies and all values reported are based on a 4th-order polynomial approximation of welfare and other outcomes as
functions of ρ(s) calculated on a grid. The minimum spacing of this grid is is: 0.5% in the d(s) =∞ cases, 1% for the ρ(s) ≥ 20% and
d(s) ≥ 3 cases and 5% for the d(s)→ 0 cases.
a bad state/good state
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It is tempting to search for the welfare-maximizing combination of the UI parameters
ρ(s) and d(s). However, allowing both replacement ratios and benefit durations to vary
at the same time yields one of two degenerate, albeit perfectly sensible, solutions to the
optimization problem.
One possibility is that it is optimal to choose a very low replacement ratio to reduce
the adverse effects on the rate of job acceptance. Once the moral hazard problem is dealt
with in this way, however, there is no need to restrict the benefit duration any more. As
a consequence, a system under which households can receive a very low benefit indefinitely
may be optimal.41
The other possibility is given by the opposite limiting case along the duration dimension.
As the negative incentive effects of effectively paying agents for being unemployed can be
reduced for any given level of generosity by reducing the benefit duration and increasing the
replacement ratio accordingly, it may be optimal to choose a fixed one-time payment at the
time of separation.42 In the case of our discrete-time model, the best benefit duration would
therefore be one period. In this scenario, moral hazard effects are so strong that agents are
willing to give up insurance against unexpectedly long unemployment durations in favour of
a mechanism that merely compensates them for the expected cost of job loss.
Table 4 compares Canadian EI to six alternative systems. These six systems are catego-
rized as belonging to three classes. For each class, the optimal system is listed along with
a “constrained optimal” one, meaning the optimal system under the additional constraint
that there is no differentiation based on the state of the economy.
The first class of UI systems does not limit benefit duration, d(s) = ∞. It turns out
that this class contains the global optimum for all UI systems considered. The second class,
41Pollak (2007) argues that it would be preferable to provide these benefits in the form of fixed social
assistance payments that are independent of previous earnings.
42Another effect that works towards making a one-time payment preferable is a discounting or interest
effect. Everything else equal, households prefer to get payments earlier. To the government it does not
matter whether it pays households today or tomorrow, because in either case it is just redistributing from
one group to another. This effect arises in part because we are comparing steady states without taking into
account the one-time expenditure or revenue resulting from the introduction of the system.
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labelled d(s) → 0, sets the benefit duration to the lowest possible value of one period,
practically converting UI into a severance-pay-like system with a one-time payment in the
first period after job loss. This class contains a local optimum. Finally, the third class
requires benefit durations of at least three months and replacement ratios of at least 20%.
There is nothing special about these threshold values, except that the lower bounds imposed
exclude corner cases like the first two classes and limit the set of UI systems to those that
look like and have the trade-offs of the majority of actual UI systems.
Some of the optimal UI systems show substantial differentiation in benefits depending
on the state of the economy, which is in line with the findings in the theoretical literature,
including Landais et al. (2010) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011). In the three scenarios,
payments that occur during recessions are, respectively, 11%, 72% and 48% higher than in the
good state. The fact that none of the optimal systems shown in table 4 shows differentiation
along the duration dimensions does not mean that such a feature is never desirable for a UI
system, as was shown in figure 3 above.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between benefit duration and welfare for a given level
of generosity Γ(s) = ρ(s)d(s) for an unconstrained UI system. Starting at the constrained
optimal system in the d(s) → 0 class, benefit duration is expanded up to a maximum of
18 months while the replacement ratios are reduced proportionally. The resulting U-shaped
relationship clearly shows that the most efficient systems are associated with either very
short benefit durations or very low replacement ratios.43
A striking observation that can be made in table 4 is how little the efficient response of
UI generosity to the state of the economy actually matters for welfare. While it is possible to
improve welfare significantly over the status quo in the steady state – by as much as 0.785%
when choosing the globally optimal policy – allowing for state-dependent benefits leads to
improvements of less than a hundredth of a percent compared to the optimal constrained
43Figure 4 is not as smooth as one might expect. The reason for this is solely the welfare criterion used.
Alternative welfare measure such as utilitarian welfare of the whole population or average expected lifetime
utility produce much smoother curves.
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Figure 4: Welfare as a Function of Benefit Duration for Constant Generosity
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Note: Generosity Γ(s) = ρ(s)d(s) = 0.8 for s ∈ {0, 1}. The system with the lowest possible benefit duration
of d(0) = d(1) = 12 is the constrained optimum on the d(s)→ 0 class in table 4, the welfare of which is
normalized to unity in the figure. The system with the longest benefit duration under consideration (18
months) and the corresponding replacement ratio of ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 4.4% is comparable to the constrained
optimum in the d(s) =∞ class.
policy. Efficiency gains of this order of magnitude are almost certainly unnoticeable, and
they are dwarfed by the effects of other choices regarding the design of the UI system.
When only the welfare changes in the bad state are considered, the cost of going with the
constrained optimum depends on how big the foregone differentiation actually is. Part of the
reason for this result is the choice of a constant tax rate over time. Most of the additional
costs of more generous benefits during recessions are paid for when when the economy is in
the more prosperous state.
While these calculations qualitatively confirm the results of Andersen and Svarer (2010),
Landais et al. (2010) and others that varying UI generosity over the cycle is desirable in
principle, they also suggest that given the limited impact of this feature of the UI system, it
may be better to look elsewhere for efficiency improvements. These findings are in line with
the results obtained by Kristoffersen (2012), who reports that in a model with self-insurance
calibrated to the US, the welfare improvements possible by adjusting UI generosity over the
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cycle are of the order of hundreds of percent.
6.2 A Region-Based Model of the Canadian Economy
This subsection is concerned with modelling regional differences in labour markets. For
the purpose of assessing the properties of EI, this is important for two reasons. The first rea-
son is that EI conditions benefits on regional unemployment rates; consequently, considering
only aggregate unemployment rates and one uniform UI policy is likely to give a distorted
picture of the implications of existing EI rules. Secondly, unemployment rates differ sub-
stantially across regions. Official regional unemployment rates in January 2013 ranged from
3.9% in Central Quebec to 31.3% in Northern Manitoba. Since any UI system is likely to
have very different effects across these highly heterogeneous regions, it is crucial to consider
unemployment levels and dynamics at the regional level to get a more accurate picture of
the EI system overall.
Our goal is to assess the implications of the EI system for welfare and inter-regional
redistribution considering business cycle effects. The results can shed light on political econ-
omy issues related to the design of the system, as highlighted by Pallage and Zimmermann
(2005b).
The model is calibrated to match EI economic regions 1 to 55.44 Using monthly data
on regional unemployment rates since July 2000,45 each observation is classified into one of
six groups corresponding to the six unemployment rate brackets associated with different
maximum benefit durations. This classification is based only on unemployment rates during
the good state. During the bad state, unemployment rates are typically higher, putting the
same set of regions into a different EI bracket with different benefit conditions. The labour
market variables for the six groups of EI economic regions are then calibrated analogously
to the aggregate simulation discussed above. The necessary data on regional unemployment
rates, unemployment durations and labour market sizes is generated from the microdata
44This excludes the three territories with a combined population of less than 120,000.
45In July 2000, EI economic regions were redefined and their number was increased slightly.
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set of the Labour Force Survey, on which the official provincial and regional unemployment
figures reported by Statistics Canada and HRSDC are based as well.46 The details of the cal-
ibration, to the extent that they differ from the calibration of the aggregate model discussed
above, are summarized in table 5.47
Table 5: Calibration: Groups of EI Economic Regions
parameter
valuea
< 6% 6− 7% 7− 8% 8− 9% 9− 10% > 10%
ω(1) 2.784 0.415 0.279 0.203 0.196 0.184
λ(0) 1.37% 1.39% 1.42% 1.45% 1.62% 2.36%
λ(1) 0.73% 0.85% 0.92% 0.95% 1.10% 1.77%
k 0.463 0.555 0.609 0.644 0.582 0.432
a per period ( 124 year)
Using these calibrated regional models, the effects of alternative benefit durations on
welfare are analyzed as follows. A UI system with a constant (i.e. time and region invariant)
benefit duration of 36 weeks, corresponding to the lowest duration actually used in Canada,
is taken as the base scenario. Three alternative scenarios are considered. A “business
cycle only” scenario only allows for an increase of benefit durations from 36 to 40 weeks
during recessions. A “region only” scenario introduces the regional differentiation of benefit
duration found in the EI system without allowing the generosity of UI to vary over time
with the business cycle. Finally, a scenario labelled “actual EI” combines both regional and
temporal variation of benefit durations, resembling the policy actually in place. For each of
these three alternative scenarios, the welfare effect of switching to it from the base scenario
is reported for each type of economic region.
46The calibration is based only on the microdata available in the Labour Force Survey. As a consequence,
the unemployment figures used are consistent with those reported by Statistics Canada, not those used by
HRSDC, which, as mentioned in footnote 8 above, differ slightly in their definition.
47The only difference in the calibration of the six groups of regions compared to the aggregate calibration
is the use of regional average unemployment rates and unemployment durations. The size of the labour force
in each region is used to aggregate the 55 regions into the six groups. The unemployment rates in the good
state for the six groups are 4.86%, 6.50% 7.50%, 8.50% 9.50% and 13.2%. The unemployment durations are
10.8, 13.2, 14.3, 15.7, 15.5, and 14.3 weeks.
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Most centrally administered UI systems redistribute income from low-unemployment to
high-unemployment regions, simply because they offer the same insurance for the same
price (i.e. contributions or payroll taxes) to people exposed to different unemployment risk
due to different regional labour market conditions. The Canadian system is even more
redistributional, as it offers better insurance for the same price to those living in high-risk
regions.
To highlight the oft-discussed distributional nature of the EI system, the welfare changes
explained above are reported for three different cases: The first case, termed “common tax
rate,” assumes that when switching from the base scenario to an alternative, UI tax rates are
adjusted equally in all regions to make sure the government budget remains balanced. The
case “pay own increment” refers to an experiment where each region adjusts its individual
tax rate to individually finance the extra cost of changing the UI system. This case eliminates
the distributional effect entirely. Finally, in the case “share own increment” the global tax
rate is adjusted uniformly to share the cost of changing the policy in one group of regions at
a time. This case differs from the first one by essentially letting each group of regions decide
on their own UI system, taking the behaviour of the others as given, instead of looking at
the changes in all regions as a package.48
Figure 5 reports the results by scenario, region and case. The first panel shows the welfare
effects of increasing the benefit duration by four weeks during recessions. Clearly, from an
efficiency perspective this is not desirable. The reason is simply that the benefits are too
generous already even under the base scenario, as suggested by figure 3. Only if the regions
with higher unemployment rates could implement the policy independently while sharing
the cost of the policy change with the rest of the county, they would find it attractive to
implement countercyclical benefits at the base level of generosity.
The other two panels show the welfare effects of switching to the regionally differentiated
system and the actual EI system with both regional and temporal differentiation. Even
48Note that the values reported for the first and the third of these cases depend, among other things, on
the relative sizes of these groups of regions as well as their tax bases.
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Figure 5: Welfare Effects of Changing UI Policy, by Group of EI Economic Regions
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though the last scenario combines the first two, it looks almost identical to the region-
only scenario. This is because the welfare effects associated with varying generosity over
the business cycle are an order of magnitude smaller than the distributional effects.49 The
findings regarding the welfare effects of the regional differentiation of EI are what one would
expect. Under a common tax rate, high-unemployment regions favour the existing system
while low-unemployment regions pay the cost. If each group of regions had to pay for
increasing UI generosity to the current level, all regions would prefer the base scenario.
This should not be surprising as even the base scenario is rather generous compared to
the optimum, as seen in the previous subsection. Finally, when faced with the option of
increasing the generosity of their own UI while sharing the costs countrywide, all groups
of regions will do this. What is perhaps most surprising about these results is the scale of
the welfare effect. The costs or benefits of choosing the actual EI system over the baseline
scenario are between -0.2% and 0.2%, likely too small to notice. Consistent with the findings
reported in the previous section, the business cycle component of the welfare effect is small
enough to be considered irrelevant.
49Notice the different scales on the three panels.
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Figure 6 compares the same scenarios as figure 5, aggregating by province instead of
groups of regions.50 As before, qualitatively the findings are what one would expect: The
welfare effect of temporal differentiation is negative but very small.51 The Atlantic Provinces
and Quebec prefer EI to the baseline system, the western provinces do not, and Ontario is
highly representative of the whole country. A measure of the welfare-relevant distribution
inherent in the system is the difference between the welfare effects in the “common tax rate”
case and the “pay own increment” case52, i.e. the difference between the black and the grey
bars in figures 5 and 6. This distributional effect is positive for all provinces east of Ontario,
and negative for the rest of the country. Still, the effect is rather small in absolute terms,
and also small compared to the total distribution brought about by the system.53
7 Robustness
This section highlights some important properties of our model and presents alternative
specifications.
Figure 7 demonstrates the importance of life-cycle effects for the evaluation of UI. The
top left panel shows the welfare change by age that results from raising the replacement
ratio from ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 30% to 40% for a fixed duration of 3 months. Agents up to age
35 tend to benefit from the change, while those older than that suffer a welfare reduction.
The reason for this pattern is that borrowing constraints affect younger households, while
50Note that the provincial results are not merely convex combinations of the results reported by group of
region. For example, the proper interpretation of the “share own increment” case is now: “What happened
if province X switched to the differentiated EI system, sharing the cost of the change countrywide?”
51In response to the 2008-09 recession, the federal government uniformly extended benefit durations by
five weeks for all eligible individuals as a discretionary and temporary measure. (This basically added five
weeks to all non-zero values in table 1.) The measure, which extended a local policy experiment to the whole
country, was effective for 18 months starting in March 2009. Our results suggest that the welfare effect of
this measure was likely positive and almost certainly tiny.
52The difference between the actual welfare cost of the differentiated system under a shared tax burden and
the welfare change that would result if provinces implemented the system without any change in transfers.
53Balancing the EI budget on a per-province basis instead of partly sharing the cost though a common tax
rate would change welfare in the provinces by between -3.32% (Prince Edward Island) and 1.02% (Manitoba).
The effects that can be attributed to the regional differentiation of the system are less than 110 of this in
magnitude.
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Figure 6: Welfare Effects of Changing UI Policy, by Province
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Note: For each province, its weight based on the size of its labour market is reported.
those above age 40 are effectively unconstrained. This can be seen in the top right panel,
which shows that consumption peaks at around age 40 and declines thereafter, which is to be
expected for well-insured households given that the interest rate is below the discount rate.
The bottom right panel shows how the liquidity constraints affect labour market outcomes.
Unemployment rates rise with age up to 40 years, which reflects older households’ choice for
longer job search. This results in a better matches for older individuals - the average match
quality is about 10% better at age 50 than at age 20.
As explained above, the welfare criterion used is utilitarian welfare of the part of the
population that has had a job at some point in their lives. This is the whole simulated
population excluding entrants into the labour market who have not yet found work. The
reason is that the welfare of this particular group can have a substantial impact on the overall
welfare measure, which is not robust to small changes in the calibration of the model.
Figure 8 shows the welfare impact of the same policy change as in figure 7, using an
inclusive utilitarian measure as well as the welfare measure that excludes entrants. The
top panels show welfare changes by age for different levels of initial endowments, which
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Figure 7: Age profiles
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Note: The “match premium” is defined as difference between the average match quality and the average
match quality of all job offers, which is unity.
are measured in months of income.54 The two welfare measures yield virtually identical
results for household aged 21 and above. Only for 20 year old households, there is a stark
difference. While those who are already employed enjoy a large welfare improvement due to
higher benefits, those who are still unemployed suffer a strong negative effect. The reason
is that the first group is comprised of liquidity constrained individuals who are entitled to
insurance, whereas the second group has no entitlement but suffers from the reduced market
tightness under more generous benefits. The two lower panels show the overall welfare effect
of the policy change for different levels of endowment. While the welfare measure that
excludes entrants yields rather predictable results – higher endowments mean less liquidity
constraints and hence less appetite for UI – the inclusive welfare measure exhibits a non-
monotonic relationship between benefit generosity and welfare.
The choice of the welfare measure does not affect the result that the welfare effects
of business cycle dependent UI are small. An alternative experiment that increases the
54As before, “income” refers to the income of an agent with productivity one on a job characterized by
the average match quality of unity outside of a recession. This measure is very close to the average starting
wage of individuals first entering the labour market.
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Figure 8: Welfare effects of increasing UI generosity by age for different initial endowments
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Figure 9: Optimal policy and the benefit of differentiation for alternative degrees of risk
aversion
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Note: The “match premium” is defined as difference between the average match quality and the average
match quality of all job offers, which is unity.
replacement ratio from 30% to 40% in recessions only rather than in both states as above
produces almost exactly the same welfare patterns as those reported in figure 8, except that
all effects are a muted by a factor 10.
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Figure 9 shows how the optimal replacement ratios in recessions depends on the replace-
ment ratio in normal times for risk aversions of σ = 1, 5. The results are presented in the
same way as those for σ = 3 in figure 3 above. As before, the dark gray bands cover policy
parameters that are within 1
100
% of the optimum in terms of welfare. The light gray areas
cover the 1
10
% range. Benefit duration is fixed at 3 months for this exercise.
Clearly, optimal benefit generosity varies significantly with the households’ risk aversion.
For log utility, the optimal policy is ρ(0) = 0 for any level of ρ(1). In the high risk aversion
case σ = 5, optimal levels of ρ(0) lie between 72% and 135%.
In both of these cases, there are levels of ρ(0) for which choosing the optimal replacement
ratio during recessions over an undifferentiated policy leads to welfare improvements of more
than 0.1%. Yet, such gains are hardly a matter of fine tuning the UI system, as they are
only possible if ρ(1) is grossly suboptimal. In such a situation, it would be most effective to
adjust ρ(1).55
In the σ = 1 case, the optimal differentiated and undifferentiated policies coincide at a
corner result, ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 0. In the high risk aversion scenario, the optimal undifferentiated
policy is ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 93%. Switching to the optimal differentiated policy of ρ(0) = 134%
and ρ(1) = 91% yields a welfare improvement of 0.037%.
While the optimal generosity of UI systems depends strongly on households preferences56,
the result that only small welfare improvements are possible by introducing business-cycle
dependent benefits into an otherwise reasonably efficient system does not.
Finally, figure 10 shows optimal replacement ratios and benefit durations in a scenario
where households are not allowed to save, so that UI benefits equal their consumption levels
during unemployment. This scenario introduces welfare payments that guarantee a minimum
income corresponding to 50% of the typical income of a 20-year-old household as well as
55Consider for example a situation where ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 20% in the σ = 5 case. Raising rho(0) to its
optimal value of 87% for this level of ρ(1) results in a welfare improvement of 0.24%. The same improvement
can be achieved by adjusting both ρ(0) and ρ(1) to 25%.
56In fact, disregarding its properties regarding inter-regional redistribution, the Canadian EI system could
be reasonably close to the optimum for some level of risk aversion above 3
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Figure 10: Optimal policy and the benefit of differentiation for hand-to-mouth consumers
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pensions of 70% of the typical income of households before retirement. These benefits ensure
that consumption is always positive.57
Notice that without savings, the link between UI generosity in the good state and optimal
benefits in the bad state almost disappears. In previous scenarios, the precautionary savings
accumulated in the good state partly determined the need for insurance in the bad state;
this is not the case in this scenario.
The welfare improvement resulting form replacing the constrained optimal replacement
ratio of ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 85.4% with the unconstrained optimum of ρ(0) = 90.3% and
ρ(1) = 84.6% is 0.003%. The effect of switching to a differentiated policy when varying
benefit durations is even smaller.58 Generally, there is little scope for improving welfare by
differentiating benefits in the neighbourhood of the constrained optimal policy. If the base
policy is not chosen efficiently, however, adjusting UI generosity in the bad state can have a
stronger positive effect on welfare, up to 0.64% in this scenario. This welfare improvement
57In this scenario, benefit duration is fixed at d(0) = d(1) = 6 when replacement ratios are varied and
replacement ratios are set to ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 60% when optimal durations are analysed.
58In this case, optimal differentiation is very small, with d(0) = 5.97 and d(1) = 5.96.
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can be even larger under a less generous welfare system.59
8 Discussion
The main finding of this paper is that potential gains from allowing benefit generosity to
be differentiated over the business cycle are small. They are small in absolute terms as long
as the UI system is reasonably efficient otherwise. They are small relative to the efficiency
improvements that can be achieved by other, more conventional means such as adjusting
general replacement ratios and benefit durations for systems that are further away from the
optimum. And, in the case of the Canadian system, the business cycle effects that result
from the unique features of the system are small compared to the welfare effects resulting
from inter-regional redistribution that also follows from this very design.
On the one hand, this means that fine-tuning a UI system for optimal intertemporal
patterns of generosity may not be worth it. On the other hand, even implementing inefficient
business-cycle dependent policies is per se unlikely to do much damage.
As pointed out in the introduction, most of the existing literature on this particular
feature of UI systems is based on models that do not allow for saving and self-insurance.
This can lead to an exaggeration of the positive effects of UI, which may be quite strong even
for low levels of risk aversion. Moreover, it may result in an emphasis of the fine tuning of
subtile aspects of the system that can strongly affect individual behaviour when household
consumption and thus indirectly behaviour is well controlled by policy; in more realistic
settings, where the policy maker has substantially less control over households who can
protect themselves effectively against the potential adverse effects of sophisticated incentive
schemes, the implementation details of a system may be less important.60
59In the lower left panel of figure 10 shows a plateau for replacement ratios below 30%. This is because
the UI system becomes irrelevant if UI benefits are typically below welfare payments. The welfare benefits
of 50% of young individuals’ typical income, which were used in this simulation, are higher than what single
households can actually receive in the form of social assistance and housing benefits. Cutting maximum
welfare payments in half makes the welfare plateau smaller and increases the maximum possible welfare
improvement from UI benefit differentiation to as much as 2.2% for values of ρ(1) < 20%.
60An example is Werning (2002), who shows that the result that benefits should decline with the duration
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Another aspect of model design that can be relevant when quantifying the welfare effects
of UI is the choice between life-cycle and infinite-horizon models. It is important to note
that in an infinite-horizon setting even with carefully calibrated, realistic income processes,
there is no reason to expect that the resulting stationary wealth distribution bears much
resemblance to the one that results under life-cycle behaviour. While it is possible to in-
clude features that help obtain a more realistic distribution61, simulating an actual life-cycle
model appears to be the most straightforward and robust way to account for the different be-
havioural and welfare effects that policy has on different groups of the population.62 We have
seen in section 7 that policy changes affect different age groups very differently. Modelling
these groups explicitly therefore seems important for quantitative exercises.
As discussed above, young individuals who have not successfully entered the labour mar-
ket yet are excluded from the welfare measure. This is done for reasons of robustness, and it
seems justifiable in our context. However, when it comes to making policy recommendations
regarding UI, this particular group is of great importance for overall welfare outcomes. This
is because by definition, the share of these households that have to find a job is 100%, which
makes them extremely sensitive to changes labour market conditions. Moreover, under many
UI systems, these individuals are not eligible to receive benefits, which means they only feel
the effects of UI changes indirectly. Interestingly, the welfare of this groups depends on the
very general equilibrium externalities that have been discussed in the context of benefit ex-
tensions and business-cycle dependent UI policies; see for example Landais et al (2010) and
Lalive et al (2013). The problem of realistically calibrating the endowment of this group63
does not arise in infinite-horizon settings, and to my knowledge it has received little attention
in the theoretical literature so far.
of an unemployment spell are not robust to allowing for hidden savings.
61See Krusell and Smith (1998) for a classic example.
62While it is straightforward to model realistic life-cycle income profiles with all their implications for
consumption and saving behaviour in life-cycle models, this is more of a challenge in infinite-horizon settings.
63This includes initial wealth, but also access to insurance from family and other welfare programs.
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9 Summary and Conclusions
This paper presented a general equilibrium model of life cycle behaviour under labour
market frictions calibrated to resemble the Canadian economy.
Simulations of a wide range of UI policies have shown that optimal systems may exhibit
large changes in generosity with the business cycle and the state of the labour market. The
variation of the benefit duration as opposed to the replacement ratio as seen in the EI
system can be an adequate way of providing better insurance during downturns; the actual
change in benefit durations over the business cycle possible under the Canadian system is
not particularly aggressive, however.
Even though our simulations confirm the theoretical prediction that adjusting UI gen-
erosity during recessions generally improves welfare, they also show that the quantitative
importance of responding efficiently to the state of the economy is typically extremely small.
Both for optimal systems and the actual EI system, the welfare improvement from varying
benefit generosity over time is measured in hundredths of percent at most, two orders of mag-
nitude smaller than the efficiency improvements that can be achieved by much simpler policy
changes such as adjusting replacement ratios or benefit durations without any conditioning
on the current state of the economy.
We also used the model to assess the distributional implications of the model both across
groups of similar regions and across provinces in terms of welfare. The patterns that emerge
match very closely what one would expect simply based on the benefits-to-contributions ra-
tios reported by HRSDC:64 The Atlantic Provinces and Quebec benefit from the more gen-
erous treatment of high-unemployment regions, whereas Ontario and the western provinces
suffer a reduction in welfare. Even though the distributional effects of the system are more
important than the insurance they provide against business cycle effects, they are still quite
small - none of the net payers among the provinces suffers a welfare reduction of more than
0.15% and none of the net recipients gains more than 0.18% from regional differentiation.
64See EI Monitoring and Assessment Report 2012, Annex 2.19.
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Appendix
A The Household’s Problem
The Bellman equation characterizing a the problem of an unemployed household of age
g in period t that has at least one more period in the labour market left is given by
V ug (ait, bit, dit, st) = max
ait+1,m
(
u(ait + y
u(bit, dit)− ait+1
1 + r
)+
βF (m)Et[V
u
g+1(ait+1, bit, dit+1, st+1)]+
β
∫ ∞
m
Et[V
e
g+1(ait+1, m˜(m,m), st+1)]dF (m)
)
.
(A.1)
Here bit is the individual’s benefit amount or last wage, which is determined upon job loss.
65
dit encodes the remaining benefit duration.
66 Given these two variables, it is possible to
determine the actual benefit payment yu(b, d). The reservation match quality an agent
chooses given her current situation is m. F (m) is the distribution function of the best match
quality offered per period.
If the agent receives a job offer with an acceptable match quality m ≥ m, Nash bargaining
takes place over the share of the output that is paid as a wage. Given the agent’s bargaining
power , the value m˜(m,m) = m+(m−m) could be interpreted as the job’s effective match
quality from the agent’s perspective, a measure that accounts for the fact that part of the
labour share will go to the firm.
The maximization problem of an employed agent of age g who is not yet about to retire
65bit = 0 for agents who have never had a job and are therefore not entitled to receive benefits.
66This variable may, however, also be used to determine whether the agent is in his waiting period.
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is
V eg (ait, m˜it, st) = max
ait+1
(
u(ait + y
e(m˜it, st, g)− ait+1
1 + r
)+
β(1− λ)Et[V eg+1(ait+1, m˜it, st+1)]+
βλEt[V
u
g+1(ait+1, b(m˜it, st, g), d(st), st+1)]
)
.
(A.2)
The household’s labour income is ye(m˜it, st, g) = (1 − α)
(
α
r+δ
) α
1−α p(st)
1
1−α m˜q(g), where
q(g) = qit is the agent’s age-dependent productivity. If the job is destroyed at the end of
the period, the agent’s entitlement to UI benefits is determined as a function of her current
income and the macro state, bit+1 = b(m˜it, st, g) and dit = d(st).
A retired individual’s problem is simple and deterministic.
Vg(ait) = max
ait+1
(
u(ait − ait+1
1 + r
) + βVg+1(ait+1)
)
, (A.3)
where Vg(ait) ≡ 0 if the age g exceeds the agent’s life span.
B Calibration
All data on the Canadian economy used in the calibration comes from Statistics Canada.
The real interest rate was calculated as the average 10-year yield of Government of
Canada marketable bonds from 2000:7 to 2012:12 minus CPI inflation.67
Recession quarters since 1976 were determined using chain-weighted seasonally adjusted
GDP68 data as periods with at least two consecutive drops in GDP. This procedure identified
four recessions69 accounting for 15 out of the 150 quarters under consideration.
The average increase in the national unemployment rate during months that fall into
recession quarters was 0.25%. In all scenarios under consideration, λ(0) was chosen to
match this value. The matching rate ω(1) was calibrated to make the model match the
67series v122487 and v41690914
68series v1992067 and v62305752
691980:Q2-1980:Q3, 1981:Q3-1982:Q4, 1990:Q2-1991:Q1 and 2008:Q4-2009:Q2
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average unemployment rate in non-recession months between 2000:7 and 2012:12, either at
the national level or for groups of regions.
The productivity drop during recessions was calculated based on annual multifactor pro-
ductivity (MFP) estimates70 using the following regression:
lnMFPt = β0 + β1t+ β2t
2 + β3RQt,
where RQt ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} is the share of recession quarters in year t. The value
exp(β3) = 0.949 is the relative productivity during recessions.
Statistics Canada does not publish employment-related data by EI economic region,71
so some time series had to be constructed directly from the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
microdata set.72 Labour force size, unemployment rate and unemployment duration series
were constructed by region and month for EI regions 1 to 55 and 2000:7 to 2012:12. All series
were seasonally adjusted. The labour force size was used for aggregating the regions into six
groups and to compute national averages. The unemployment rates and durations by group
of regions were used to calibrate the regional models. The national average of unemployment
duration was also used in the calibration of the model to the aggregate Canadian economy.
C Model Solution and Simulation
The household’s problem is solved by numerical dynamic programming, starting at the
final period (number 1,440) and proceeding backward to the first. Value functions are rep-
resented on a multi-dimensional grid, using linear interpolation.73
70series v41712881
71There are data by “economic region,” but the definition of regions used by Statistics Canada does not
match EI economic regions.
72The public-use file of the LFS does not contain geographic information that is more detailed than
provinces. Access to the full dataset I used is restricted.
73An exception to this rule are intervals in which the value function reaches its infimum, −∞ for our
parametrization. In this case, a non-linear function with the proper asymptotic behaviour is used. Even
though linear interpolation may appear inferior to more sophisticated interpolation techniques such as higher
order splines, its simplicity makes it so much faster that it becomes possible to use much finer grids in the
computation, resulting improved accuracy.
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These grids are given by AG×MG×SG for employed agents, AG×BG×UG×SG for
unemployed agents and just AG for retired agents. The possible macro states are represented
by SG ∈ {0, 1}. AG is the asset grid for values of ait ≥ 0. It is composed of a linearly spaced
section close to zero and a geometrically spaced section for higher asset levels. It has up to
497 nodes, although the grids for younger agents omit some of the higher nodes that cannot
be reached to save space and computation time. MG represents levels of match quality. It
has 15 nodes at the midpoints of their respective quantiles plus three extra nodes at 50% and
75% of the lowest and 150% of the highest quantile nodes. The benefit grid BG is a 19-point
grid derived from MG, but adjusted to cover the whole relevant range of wages across age
groups. Finally, UG represents the remaining benefit duration as well as special states such
as being in the waiting period. Its size depends on the maximum benefit duration and the
complexity of the rules, but it is typically 7 nodes or less.
To solve the optimization problem of unemployed households, it is necessary to calculate
the expectation over the continuous match quality variable m as shown in equation A.1 in
appendix A. This is done using a quadrature-like approach, based on the grid points MG
chosen along this dimension and using the appropriate probability weights.
Solving the general equilibrium problem involves finding the levels of market tightness
θ(0), θ(1) that yield zero expected profits for jobs created in the bad and the good state,
respectively. It also requires finding the tax rate that balances the government’s budget. To
solve for the market tightness, I start from a reasonable guess, solve the household’s problem
for the implied job offer rates ω(s), and then simulate the economy for a large number
of periods to calculate aggregate variables, including the firms’ profits. If the zero-profit
condition is not met with the required accuracy, I update my guesses of θ(s) and start over.
In most scenarios, it takes about 5-10 of these iterations to determine market tightness.
All these computations are done for a tax rate of zero. Once the equilibrium market
tightness has been determined, it is straightforward to calculate the tax rate required to
balance the government budget based on measured expenditures and the tax base. All that
42
needs to be done at this point is to adjust some of the results, including consumption and
welfare measures, for the tax rate. This can be done so easily because the preferences are
CRRA and the tax base includes all sources of household income except interest.
Solving the household’s problem for a typical set of parameters takes about 1-2 minutes
(on one processor core) and requires approximately 2GB of memory. Given the large extent
of the history simulated based on the household’s behaviour (see footnote 29), this part of
the computation takes much longer, approximately 10-20 minutes. It thus takes about 1-2
hours to solve the full general equilibrium model for one set of policy parameters.74
D Simulated UI Scenarios
Figure 11: UI Generosity and Welfare
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Note: Highest welfare normalized to 1. Generosity Γ(s) is given by replacement ratio times benefit
duration.
Figure 11 summarizes the results obtained in a large number of policy simulations using
scatter plots. In these simulations, the replacement ratios and benefit durations were varied
between 0 and 100% and 0 and 18 months, respectively, for both states of the economy.
74Combined, all calculations performed for this version of the paper took about 4 12 core-years to complete.
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The policy variants chosen here are on a grid with intervals of 20 percentage points for
replacement ratios and 3 months for durations.75 Note that this choice of grid implicitly
imposes the constraint that if there is a positive benefit, it is paid at a rate of at least
20% for at least three months. While this restriction is consistent with typical real-world
implementations of UI, it excludes some interesting policies, as will be seen later. For
the purpose of visualizing the welfare patterns that arise, for each state s the replacement
ratio ρ(s) and the benefit duration d(s) are combined into a compound generosity measure
Γ(s) = ρ(s)d(s).76
Figure 11 (b) shows that Γ(1) is actually a rather good predictor of the efficiency of a
UI system. In fact, the upper envelope of the graph suggests that a low to moderate level
of generosity - in our case approximately Γ(1) < 4 - is a necessary condition for attaining
high welfare. Panel (a) of the figure, which shows Γ(0), gives a similar picture, although
varying generosity in the bad state has a quantitatively much smaller effect on welfare, so
that looking at this statistic alone reveals rather little about the likely welfare properties of
a UI scheme.
Finally, panel (c) of figure 11 plots welfare levels by the difference in generosity between
the two states, Γ(0) − Γ(1). The best outcomes are achieved for Γ(0) ≥ Γ(1), which is
consistent with the expectation that it is optimal to provide more generous insurance during
recessions. Note, however, that the quantitative importance of following this rule is really
small.77
Figure 12 presents this information differently, showing the highest levels of efficiency
attainable as a function of Γ(0) and Γ(1). Interestingly, this function has a plateau for lower
levels of generosity. For Γ(0) ≤ 9 and Γ(1) ≤ 4.8, welfare levels within 0.5% of the optimum
75 All distinct scenarios on the grid (ρ(0), ρ(1), d(0), d(1)) ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}2×{0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18}2
are simulated. Some of the 1,764 combinations are redundant, because for a replacement ratio of zero the
benefit duration is irrelevant and vice versa. In total, 961 distinct UI policies are considered.
76A generosity of Γ(s) = 9 could, for example, correspond to a 100% replacement ratio for nine months
or a 50% replacement ratio for 18 months. This is a simple ad-hoc way of measuring UI generosity. For a
more general and principled approach see Pallage et al. (2013).
77The vertical axis in panel (c) is scaled differently to make this effect visible.
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Figure 12: Maximum Welfare as a Function of UI Generosity
Note: Highest welfare normalized to 1. Generosity Γ(s) is given by replacement ratio times benefit
duration. The figure shows the upper convex envelope for the welfare levels obtained in the 961 policy
experiments described in footnote 75.
are attainable. Many actual UI systems fall into this area, and the Canadian EI system with
generosities between 4.5 and 5.7 is not far off.78
Another interesting observation that can be made based on the simulations presented in
this section is that there appears to be a tight relationship between the unemployment rate
and welfare over a range of policy parameters. While this close and over a wide range nearly
linear relationship must break down in the neighbourhood of an interior optimum, it still
appears that the unemployment rate is a good indicator for the quality of a UI system at
the levels of generosity typically implemented.
78This does not imply, of course, that EI does lead to welfare close to the optimum. It just means that
potential efficiency is not made impossible by excessive generosity.
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Figure 13: Welfare vs. Unemployment for a Range of UI Policies
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Note: Welfare and unemployment outcomes for the 961 UI policies described in footnote 75.
References
Andersen, T.M. and M. Svarer (2010): “Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insur-
ance,” IZA Discussion Paper 5196, September 2010.
Andersen, T.M. and M. Svarer (2011): “State Dependent Unemployment Benefits,” Journal
of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 78(2), 325-344.
Baily, M.N. (1978)” “Some Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of Public
Economics, Vol. 10(3), 379-420.
Barron, J.M., M.C. Berger, and D.A. Black (1997): “Employer Search, Training, and Va-
cancy Duration,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 35(1), 167-92.
Chetty, R. (2006): “A General Formula for the Optimal Level of Social Insurance,” Journal
of Public Economics, Vol. 90(10-11), 1879-1901.
Ek, S. (2012): “Unemployment Benefits and Taxes: How Should Policy Makers Redistribute
Income over the Business Cycle?” IZA Discussion Paper 6308, January 2012.
46
Farber, H.S. and R.G. Valletta (2013): “Do Extended Unemployment Benefits Lengthen
Unemployment Spells? Evidence from Recent Cycles in the U.S. Labor Market,” Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco working paper 2013-09.
Gruber, J. (1997): “The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 97(1), 192-295.
Hagedorn, M. and I. Manovskii (2008): “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemploy-
ment and Vacancies Revisited,” American Economic Review, vol. 98(4), 1692-1706.
Hopenhayn, H.A. and J.P. Nicolini (1997): “Optimal Unemployment Insurance,” Journal of
Political Economy 105(2), 412-438.
Jung, P. and K. Kuester (2011): “Optimal Labor-Market Policy in Recessions,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia working paper 11-48.
Kiley, M.T. (2003): “How Should Unemployment Benefits Respond to the Business Cycle?”
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 3(1), 1-20.
Kristoffersen, M.S. (2012): “Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Benefits with Wealth
Heterogeneity and Precautionary Savings,” Economics Working Papers 2012-19.
Kroft, K and M.J. Notowidigdo (2011): “Should Unemployment Insurance Vary With The
Local Unemployment Rate? Theory And Evidence,” working paper, November 2010.
Krusell, P., T. Mukoyama and A. S¸ahin (2010) “Labor-Market MAtching with Precautionary
Savings and Aggregate Fluctuations,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 77(4), 1477-1507.
Krusell, P. and A.A. Smith (1998): “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroecon-
omy,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106(5), 867-896.
Lalive, R., C. Landais and J. Zweimu¨ller (2013): “Market Externalities of Large Unemploy-
ment Insurance Extension Programs,” CESifo Working Paper Series 4414.
47
Landais, C., P. Michaillat and E. Saez (2010): “Optimal Unemployment Insurance over the
Business Cycle,” NBER Working Paper 16525, November 2010.
Mitman, K. and S. Rabinovich (2011): “Pro-cyclical unemployment benefits? Optimal policy
in an equilibrium business cycle model,” PIER Working Paper 11-010.
Moyen, S. and N. Sta¨hler (2009): “Unemployment Insurance and the Business Cycle: Pro-
long Benefit Entitlements in Bad Times?” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series 1:
Economic Studies No 2009,30.
Mukoyama, T. (2012): “Understanding the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Insurance
Policy in General Equilibrium,” mimeo.
Nakajima, M. (2012): “A Quantitative Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Extensions,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 59, 686-702.
Pallage, S., L. Scruggs and C. Zimmermann (2013): “ Measuring Unemployment Insurance
Generosity,” Political Analysis, forthcoming.
Pallage, S. and C. Zimmermann (2005): “Heterogeneous labor markets and generosity to-
wards the unemployed: an international perspective,” Journal of Comparative Economics
33(1), 88-106.
Pallage, S. and C. Zimmermann (2005b): “On Voters’ Attitudes towards Unemployment
Insurance Subsidies across Regions: A Canadian Simulation,” Journal of Population Eco-
nomics, Vol. 19, 391-410.
Pissarides, C.A. (2000): Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA)
and London.
Pollak, A. (2007): “Optimal unemployment insurance with heterogeneous agents,” European
Economic Review, vol. 51(8), 2029-2053.
48
Pollak, A. (2013): “Unemployment, Human Capital Depreciation, and Unemployment In-
surance Policy,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, forthcoming.
Rothstein, J. (2011)” “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession,”
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley, working paper.
Rupert, P. and G. Zanella (2010): “Revisiting Wage, Earnings, and Hours Profiles,” mimeo.
Schmieder, J.F., T.M von Wachter and S. Bender (2012): “The Effects of Extended Un-
employment Insurance over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity
Estimates over Twenty Years,” NBER working paper 17813.
Schuster, P. (2012):“Cyclical unemployment benefits and non-constant returns to matching,”
mimeo.
Sa´nchez, J.M. (2008): “Optimal state-contingent unemployment insurance,” Economics Let-
ters, 98(3), 348-357.
Shimer, R. and I. Werning (2007): “Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122(3), 1145-1185.
Sienkiewicz,  L. (2011): “EEO Review: Adapting unemployment benefit systems to the
economic cycle, 2011 - Poland,” European Employment Observatory.
Silva, J.I. and M. Toledo (2005): “Labor Turnover Costs and the Behavior of Vacancies and
Unemployment,” Society for Economic Dynamics 2005 Meeting Papers 775.
Tatsiramos, K. and J.C. van Ours (2012): “Labor Market Effects of Unemployment Insurance
Design,” CentER discussion paper 2012-082.
Werning, I. (2002) “Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Unobservable Savings,” mimeo.
49
